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US ARMY BATTLE DYNAMIC CONCEPT

1 JUNE 1994

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FOREWORD

Depth and simultaneous attack is defined as the simultaneous application of combat power against an enemy throughout the depth of the battlefield. As a battle dynamic, depth and simultaneous attack accelerates an enemy's disorganization, disintegration, and finally his destruction.

The purpose of this concept is threefold. First, it explores the theory or why we conduct a simultaneous attack at depth to achieve operational and tactical objectives. The concept briefly tracks the historical evolution of the dual notions of simultaneity and deep operations beginning with the Soviet military writings of the 1920's and 30's following on to the U.S. doctrinal development of AirLand Battle and AirLand Operations.

Secondly, the concept explains the practice or how to plan and execute depth and simultaneous attack in terms of required capabilities. This practice ranges from the broad application of tactics and the operational art, to proposed procedures and techniques for planning, coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing joint and combined combat power.

Finally, this paper expands and fleshes out the requirements for simultaneous and continuous operations as they are addressed in the TRADOC overarching future warfighting concept.

1 June 1994

Military Operations

DEPTH AND SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK BATTLE DYNAMIC CONCEPT

Summary. This pamphlet serves as the basis for developing doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, and materiel changes focused on soldiers (DTLOMS) for operations involving depth and simultaneous attack. It provides the framework to understand depth and simultaneous attack and the required capabilities for U.S. Army and allied/coalition forces.

Applicability. This concept applies to TRADOC organizations that develop DTLOMS requirements and products.

Suggested improvements. The proponent for this pamphlet is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments. Send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) through channels to Commander, TRADOC, ATTN: ATCD-P, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. Suggested improvements may also be submitted using DA Form 1045 (Army Ideas for Excellence Program (AEIP) Proposal).

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1-1. Purpose. This pamphlet describes the required capabilities for the conduct of depth and simultaneous attack in support of joint and combined operations during states of conflict and war.

1-2. References.

- FM 100-5 (Operations) is a required publication.
- Related publications are:
 - Depth and Simultaneous Attack—A Definition and Concept Summary developed by the TRADOC "Boathouse Gang II," May 92.
 - TRADOC Vision for Future Battle, Apr 93.

1-3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms. Abbreviations and special terms used in this concept are explained in the glossary.

Chapter 2 Overview

2-1. Why the concept is needed. Emerging technology provides the post Cold War Army with the potential for vastly improved capabilities for simultaneous operations and for fighting at depth. This concept articulates these capabilities and will accomplish the following:

- Project a battle vision from which the national research and development community can focus their efforts to leverage technology.

b. Provide a conceptual basis for the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory's efforts in the areas of research and experimentation.

c. Serve as a source document for the development of depth and simultaneous attack as it impacts on future doctrine (tactics, techniques, and procedures), training, organizations, materiel, leader and soldier developments.

2-2. Threat environment.

a. The strategic setting in which U.S. Forces will operate is significantly less certain today than in the recent past. Plans for the post Cold War Army now must account for numerous unknowns in identifying specific adversaries and possible operational environments. While global political conditions from a U.S. vantage have improved dramatically, the expanding international arms market and the proliferation of high technology weapons are disturbing factors in an increasingly unstable world.

b. For the remainder of this century and the early years of the next, the United States could face a number of opponents armed with sophisticated weaponry. Potential enemies could possess sizeable modern armored combat forces, long range artillery, and tactical air support. They could have state-of-the-art command and control systems as well as reconnaissance, intelligences, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities. During the recent Gulf War, Iraqi Scud missiles served as harbingers of a different and dangerous threat. The Iraqis clearly strained the allied coalition with Scud attacks on Israel. These weapons had little intrinsic military value and yet their use could have achieved strategic results for Iraq if Israel had retaliated with military force. In future conflicts, we must be prepared to fight an adversary who possesses theater and tactical ballistic missiles, some of which could be delivered with precision and be armed with weapons of mass destruction.

2-3. Force Projection Army.

a. Our force projection Army, in concert with the forces of other services and nations, is required to rapidly deploy from CONUS or OCONUS bases and dominate maneuver, conduct deep precision strikes, and win the information war. Army forces could be used for a variety of contingencies across the range of military operations, from war to operations other than war (OOTW), involving hostile or nonhostile actions. In all hostile situations, U.S. forces will be expected to win quickly and with minimal casualties.

b. Current trends indicate that battlefields of the future will be less dense in terms of numbers of forces and increasingly lethal with high technology RISTA, battle command, and precision munitions. Successful commanders must have the ability to rapidly concentrate the effects of combat power on the enemy at critical places and times throughout the depth of the battlespace.

c. The concept of depth and simultaneous attack is applicable in a number of situations across the range of military operations. In conditions of war, in both mature and immature theaters, an early depth and simultaneous attack capability is essential for hastening an enemy's defeat while protecting the force. During OOTW involving conflict, this same capability enables a measured response while providing early lethality. In non-hostile OOTW activities, the threat of simultaneous attacks in depth may deter hostile aggression and thus provide for increased force protection.

d. In conducting a simultaneous attack in depth, the commander will attack high payoff targets using organic and supporting long-range fires, both lethal and non-lethal, and combined arms maneuver. Other elements of depth and simultaneous attack include information operations, special operations, and psychological operations. The following actions are examples of depth and simultaneous attack operations:

- (1) Defeating integrated air defense systems.
- (2) Conducting information operations and command and control warfare (C2W).
- (3) Conducting operational and tactical counterfire.
- (4) Vectoring precision combined arms forces against critical objectives.

2-4. Limitations. The concept of depth and simultaneous attack is based on the application of joint and combined combat power. For this reason, the concept must be coordinated with other services and with our allies. This is necessary not only to reach a consensus on the relative merit of the concept but also to establish the detailed procedures needed for its planning and execution. The extent to which this concept can be applied is based on the degree of planning and coordination conducted with other services and allies.

Chapter 3 Concept

"The enemy is best defeated by fighting him close and deep simultaneously." (FM 100-5, Operations, Jun 93.)

3-1. Overview.

a. Depth and simultaneous attack is the simultaneous application of combat power against an enemy throughout the depth and breadth of the battlefield. The objective of the concept goes beyond defeating the enemy—it is to accelerate his defeat. Although the discrete concepts of fighting at depth and fighting simultaneity are neither new nor unique to the American Army, modern technology enables us to leverage these two concepts as a single dynamic on the battlefield. U.S. forces have the potential to hold enemy centers of gravity and critical combat functions at risk.

The enemy commander will be presented with the unenviable dilemma of having to react to multiple threats, overwhelming his ability to cope with the battlefield situation. In short, friendly forces will create conditions on the battlefield where the enemy has no place to hide and no time to rest. Successfully accelerating defeat of the enemy will require near real-time command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I); long-range precision munitions; highly mobile combined arms forces; and, support for deployment from strategic and theater assets.

b. The dynamic of depth and simultaneous attack must be considered doctrinally in the context of the principles of war and tenets of Army operations (FM 100-5, Operations). For example, simultaneous attack could be perceived as the piecemealing of combat power or the attack of all targets as if they were of equal importance. To the contrary, applying the principle of mass, all elements of combat power are synchronized so they will have decisive effect on the enemy in the shortest period of time. Likewise, applying the principle of economy of force, those targets must be attacked that will yield the most effective employment of combat power. Commanders must weigh the considerations of assets available, offense and defense, fires (lethal and non-lethal) and maneuver, political constraints, centers of gravity, battle command, and the desired military end state.

3-2. Evolution toward depth and simultaneous attack. "... artillery, tanks, aviation and infantry, cooperating amongst themselves, simultaneously inflict a defeat on the enemy's combat order throughout its whole depth." Tukhachevski, as quoted by Losik.

a. The notions of fighting at depth and of simultaneity have their origins in the writings of several military theorists. Most notable are Soviets Mikhail Tukhachevski and Vladimir Triandafillov. Tukhachevski originally described the principle of simultaneity as all arms operating simultaneously along a broad front. In such a situation, mobile reserves would penetrate to tactical depths along the front. Triandafillov's principle of interchangeability, i.e., the maneuvering of forces and fires at depth, caused Tukhachevski to modify his thinking from simultaneous engagements along a broad front to the simultaneous use of penetrations at depth for operational purposes. These theories were successfully tested in World War II and had a profound impact on subsequent Soviet doctrine concerning the use of fires and combined arms maneuver.

b. In the 1970s, U.S. Army doctrine transitioned from the active defense—attrite a numerically superior force while giving ground until an offensive can be launched—to AirLand Battle. In AirLand Battle doctrine, particularly as it applied to Europe, deep fires were used to attack and "meter the flow" of enemy follow-on echelons in order to establish conditions for the successful conclusion of the close fight.

c. The AirLand Operations (ALO) Concept, which was approved in the early 1990's but never fully incorporated

in doctrine, placed great importance on fighting at depth. Under ALO, the Army would conduct operations performing four interrelated functions—stages of the operational cycle—designed to focus activities of all elements of the force. The four stages are detection/preparation, establish conditions for decisive operations, decisive operations, and force reconstitution. Even though the stages were not intended to be prescriptive, operationally they had a tendency to be viewed as such. This posed potential risks since forces will not always fight in environments where specific stages can be timed to correspond to rapidly unfolding situations. In contrast to perceptions of ALO stages, the essence of depth and simultaneous attack is to quickly bring about the enemy's defeat without having to wait on the turning of phased, operational cycles and thus save lives and time.

3-3. Theory for fighting deep.

a. The overriding mandate for U.S. forces is to win quickly and decisively with minimal loss of life. In fulfilling this mandate, commanders will continue to fight in three dimensions throughout the enemy's depth for two very basic reasons. The first is to accomplish the assigned mission and the second reason is to protect the force.

b. In accomplishing the mission, commanders will extend the battlefield in space, time, and purpose by leveraging the synergy of all available attack means to achieve operational and tactical objectives. In fighting deep and close simultaneously, commanders will:

(1) Dominate the enemy, either directly or indirectly, through attack or the threat of attack. Operations will be conducted with precision fires and combined arms maneuver throughout the three dimensional battle space.

(2) Attack enemy centers of gravity and critical functions such as the enemy's ability to generate and sustain combat power. Examples of centers of gravity are the mass of enemy forces or elite units, major command and control (C2) facilities, operational reserves, or any other asset which constitutes a hub of military power.

(3) Deny the enemy his source of combat power by eliminating his firepower and ability to maneuver along with his leadership.

(4) Seize, hold, and deny key terrain throughout the battle space.

(5) Interdict enemy lines of communication and lines of operation.

(6) Conduct information operations and C2W operations to deny or manipulate the enemy's ability to command and control.

(7) Dictate the terms for decisive operations.

(8) Defeat committed enemy formations throughout the depth of their dispositions.

(9) Seize and retain the initiative while controlling the tempo of operations.

c. Fighting at depth is a key aspect of operational and tactical force protection. Successful deep operations takes away the enemy's ability to hold our centers of gravity and critical functions at risk by disrupting and destroying his attack capabilities, RISTA, and command and control. For operational purposes, force protection involves defeating the enemy's short, medium, and long range rockets and ballistic missiles, air defenses, and air forces (including cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles [UAV], and attack/armed reconnaissance helicopters). For tactical purposes, force protection entails eliminating enemy indirect fire systems along with air defenses and tactical air capabilities. Achieving force protection demands the integration of multiple target acquisition, intelligence, and attack means with a highly responsive command and control system. The precision strike aspect of air defense is critical in countering an enemy's ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Another key aspect of force protection is countering an enemy's ability to disrupt or destroy our ability to command and control and to process information.

3-4. Simultaneous attack.

a. The aim of simultaneous attack is to rapidly deny the enemy the ability to conduct military operations throughout a given battle space. The enemy is attacked from what appears to be all directions, blinding his RISTA and command and control in the process. As a result, the enemy commander is overwhelmed to the point where he is unable to concentrate on any single thrust, and eventually can no longer cope. Soon, his combat power is disintegrated and his entire force is disarrayed. Decisive defeat is imminent.

b. A simultaneous attack is not an instantaneous event. It has a beginning and an end. The factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) will determine how a simultaneous attack is executed. The challenge for commanders will be to compress the time it takes to establish the conditions for ultimate decisive victory.

3-5. Combining depth and simultaneity. Combining the concepts of deep operations and simultaneous attack is a total approach to warfighting which creates dynamic opportunities to extend the battlefield in space, time, and purpose. The time required to establish conditions for decisive operations and accelerate the enemy's defeat is reduced. In pursuit of operational and tactical objectives, concurrent operations take place close, deep, and rear, to include support of lodgement areas. The commander directly influences the enemy throughout the depth of his battle space. Decisive close combat is extended throughout the battlefield by accurately vectoring and massing the effects of precision fires and combined arms forces. Concentrated effects of combat power are replicated and synchronized at critical places and times on an extended battlefield. By maneuvering and massing the effects of long range precision fires and the rapid maneuver of combined arms, the enemy is paralyzed to the point of final destruction.

3-6. Depth and simultaneous attack—the practice.

a. General.

(1) The concept of depth and simultaneous attack will normally be executed at division, corps, and echelons above corps (EAC). Depth and simultaneous attack will usually be a joint action and in many instances will be conducted with allied and coalition forces.

(2) In conducting depth and simultaneous attack, in both offensive and defensive situations, the principles of war and tenets of Army operations apply. In extending the battlefield, special emphasis is placed on concentrating the effects of combat power at critical places and times, and conducting secondary attacks as required.

(3) In preparing for depth and simultaneous attack, commanders must answer the basic questions of the operational art:

(a) What is the desired military end state and how does that end state support strategic objectives?

(b) What action or sequence of actions will result in the desired end state?

(c) How should available resources be applied to achieve the required actions?

(4) Two broad capabilities are imperative for successful execution of depth and simultaneous attack. First, commanders must have a high degree of situational awareness. They will be able to find and identify most of the elements of an enemy's order of battle in near-real-time. Secondly, commanders must have the ability to strike and defeat located enemy elements with precision and highly lethal effects, in near-real-time, and at the times and places of their choosing.

(5) Early deploying forces must have an initial depth and simultaneous attack capability at the very beginning of an employment. This capability will include adequate battle command, RISTA, long range precision strike means, air and ground defenses, and a highly mobile, combined arms maneuver force.

b. Planning the attack.

(1) Commanders will visualize their entire battle space. This visualization, made possible through a focused intelligence effort, will include the enemy's disposition—identification and locations of combat formations, centers of gravity, tactical and operational reserves, air defenses, logistic support structure, and command, control, and communications (C³)—and an assessment of enemy intentions.

(2) In preparing to synchronize available attack means, commanders and their staffs will establish the required sensor-to-shooter fusion linkages to ensure a near-real-time attack of critical mobile targets. Using mobile, near-real-time battle command systems, commanders will determine and disseminate

operational and tactical missions and prioritized targets. Engagement areas and specific trigger events will be specified and coordinated. Staffs will use long-range, secure communications and near-real-time information management to facilitate dissemination of command, control, and coordination measures, including air space control measures.

(3) Joint and combined precision strike actions are planned to achieve specific operational and tactical objectives. Examples of objectives could be destroying an enemy's integrated air defenses, denying him his RISTA capabilities, disrupting or eliminating his command and control, negating his ability to attack deep by destroying his long range missile and attack aircraft, and denying him the use of his reserves. Precision strikes require unity of effort among all arms and service components. A clear and thorough understanding of commander's intent by all is a must. The joint force commander may assign service components specific missions to defeat certain enemy critical functions. For example, the land component commander could be given responsibility for attacking critical mobile targets such as tactical missiles or moving columns of armored vehicles within an assigned area of responsibility. An air component commander could be responsible for interdicting fixed or semi-fixed targets such as command and control nodes, air fields, and logistics facilities, etc. In essence, the joint force commander must optimize the synergy of each service components' respective capabilities for attacking simultaneously at depth.

c. Executing the attack. In conducting a simultaneous attack in depth, the commander will execute a number of actions, under the broad heading of joint precision strikes, throughout the depth of the battlefield. These strikes will consist of long range organic and supporting fires and combined arms maneuver along with the integrated employment of psychological operations and special operations forces. The following actions summarize such an operation:

(1) Destruction of integrated air defenses. The commander will focus appropriate RISTA assets on enemy air acquisition means and air defense weapons. Integrating command and control nodes for centrally controlled air defense systems will be designated as high payoff targets. The goal will be to deny the enemy the ability to defend his skies.

(2) Blinding the enemy. Commanders will seek to deny the enemy use of his RISTA capabilities. This will include destroying aerial reconnaissance and information gathering platforms where possible. Enemy emitters will be attacked with precision long range fires, manned attack means and unmanned loitering aircraft which will home in on and destroy enemy radio and radar emitters with lethal and nonlethal (directed energy) means.

(3) Winning the information war. Measures to be taken may include the establishment of electromagnetic-spectrum supremacy through non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse generators, spacebased

information denial systems, and computer viruses. The thrust of our C2W effort will be to destroy or manipulate command, control, and communications facilities. Joint and combined electronic warfare and state-of-the-art deception actions will be integrated and synchronized with all other efforts during a simultaneous attack at depth. Critical command and control nodes will be attacked using single or multiple means to include long range weapons employing anti-radiation and other lethal submunitions, special operations forces, and attack aircraft. A commander may employ ground or air maneuver forces to achieve positional advantage over selected critical command and control centers. Such an action would culminate in the delivery of long range precision fires.

(4) Eliminating the enemy's ability to attack with fires. Counterfire continues to play a pivotal role in conducting a simultaneous attack in depth, especially for achieving operational objectives. Commanders must not allow the enemy to hold our centers of gravity and critical functions at risk with theater and tactical missiles. In addition to destroying inbound missiles, commanders will conduct attack operations against missile launchers both before and after firing. We will track enemy "smoking launchers" from the firing point back to a reload position where we may find a more lucrative target consisting of fuel, ammo, and C2 vehicles, etc. Attack operations against theater and tactical missiles is the most time sensitive operation of depth and simultaneous attack. For this reason, commanders may specify certain MLRS launchers to be loaded with the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and to be oriented on a designated engagement area. Airspace clearances for ATACMS will be preplanned as much as possible. At a minimum, the commander will have the ability to launch missiles within a half-minute to two minutes from the time of target identification.

(5) Vectoring highly mobile combined arms forces to dominate the enemy's combat formations. Technology advances in precision fires, high resolution RISTA, enhanced situational awareness, near-real-time battle command, and the mobility and lethality of air and ground maneuver will enable us to vector precision forces throughout the battlefield. Commanders will employ combined arms against a variety of objectives at varying depths to include enemy combat forces, tactical and operational reserves, logistics facilities, and critical command and control centers. The rapid commitment of combined arms forces extends the decisive violence of close combat to the enemy throughout the battle space.

3-7. Required capabilities. The degree of success in executing depth and simultaneous attack will be determined by our efforts to leverage emerging technology. Combat developments and battle lab experiments must be focused in four general categories: battlefield preparation, synchronization, simultaneous attack execution, and force protection. Commanders and battle staffs must have the following capabilities:

a. Battlefield preparation.

(1) Accurate, near-real-time information. Accurate, enhanced situational awareness must be available to all joint and combined leaders at all echelons from pre-deployment to the post hostilities phase of an operation. This information must contain all elements of the friendly situation and the enemy situation.

(2) Near-real-time access to information. All available RISTA means (joint and national to include space based assets) must provide accurate assessment of the enemy order of battle, 24 hours per day in all environmental conditions. These systems must also provide near-real-time target information (identification and location, current and projected) on enemy short, medium, and long dwell targets, emitting or passive, throughout the battle space. At the same time, data bases must provide instant access to information pertaining to the friendly situation. Leaders at all echelons must have access to information, at a glance, concerning unit locations, weapons and munitions status, coordination measures, and critical administrative and logistics data.

(3) Expert systems and automated decision making tools for intelligence and targeting will produce a common relevant picture of the battlefield. These systems will be designed to assist in identification, and location of enemy centers of gravity, critical functions, and other high payoff targets. They will provide the required battle planning and targeting interfaces between a joint force headquarters and the functional components, e.g., air, land, sea. They will perform the following functions: rapidly translate operational and tactical objectives into prioritized targets; establish named and targeted areas of interest, engagement areas, and trigger events; determine and allocate appropriate attack means to subordinate commanders; and specify methods of control for attack means, e.g., centralized versus decentralized execution. These systems will provide enhanced situational awareness, at a glance, they will perform weapons air space clearance and deconfliction, and they will also provide accurate battle damage assessment (BDA) and target damage assessment (TDA).

(4) Near-real-time sensor-to-shooter fusion linkages between sensors, intelligence facilities, C2 nodes, and weapons will enable totally decentralized launch procedures for long range missiles while ensuring that controlling headquarters are kept "in the loop". Sensor-to-shooter links must be timely and sufficiently accurate to defeat critical mobile targets.

b. Synchronization.

(1) Long range, mobile communications systems. Future communications systems must be compatible with joint and combined forces. These systems must incorporate voice, digital, video, and graphical communications.

(2) Near-real-time information dissemination. The near-real-time ability to establish and disseminate

critical coordination and control measures, air space clearance for all friendly aircraft, and attack deconfliction measures must be incorporated in future command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems.

(3) Battle command system. A seamless, highly mobile, battle command system which is fully interoperable with all elements of the joint and combined force must be developed. This system must enable the commander to function on the move as he maneuvers and masses the effects of combat power throughout the depth of the battle space.

(4) Automated coordination and targeting system. Fully automated, rapid coordination procedures and target fusion processes, using expert systems and/or artificial intelligence which are fully interoperable with other services and allies, must be developed. These systems will receive target information from multiple sensors. They will fuse the data into accurately identified, confirmed target locations which will be instantaneously broadcast to the predesignated attack elements and to all appropriate command and control headquarters.

(5) Automated Combat Service Support (CSS) system. A seamless support and sustainment capability, which is fully interoperable through the battle command architecture with all required elements of the joint and combined force, must be developed.

c. Simultaneous attack execution.

(1) Organizational and materiel agility. Execution of simultaneous attack requires the organizational and materiel agility to rapidly vector highly mobile combined arms maneuver forces (air and ground) over extended distances for the purpose of achieving positional advantage over selected enemy elements. Such actions must culminate in the decisive defeat of an enemy through the delivery of massive direct and indirect fires.

(2) Long-range precision fires. Long-range precision fires to defeat enemy short, medium, and long dwell targets, at operational and tactical depths must be developed.

(3) Improved munitions. A variety of precision kill and improved conventional munitions that are effective against all enemy targets at operational and tactical depths must be developed. Examples include directed energy weapons, mission kill munitions (alternate kill), and anti-radiation munitions.

(4) "Brilliant" munitions. "Brilliant" programmable munitions capable of locating, identifying (sitting or moving, soft or hard, passive or emitting, etc), discriminating, attacking, and defeating a variety of targets must be developed.

d. Force protection.

(1) Tactical and theater missile defense. Tactical and theater missile defense against enemy long, medium, and short range rockets and ballistic missiles must be developed.

(2) Air defense. Air defense against cruise missiles, UAVs/RPVs, armed aircraft, and attack/armed reconnaissance helicopters must be pursued to ensure the survivability of our forces.

(3) Destruction of integrated air defenses. The ability to destroy an enemy's integrated air defense system to include weapons, target acquisition, C2, and logistics facilities, must be developed.

(4) Fratricide prevention. Improved measures to prevent fratricide must be developed.

(5) Information operations and C2. Improved measures to protect our ability to process and use information and to make timely and correct decisions.

Chapter 4

Implications

4-1. Doctrine. Doctrine must embrace the vastly improved capabilities to see the enemy and attack him at depth. This will necessitate change in our thought process and in our methods of execution. The ramifications of these issues need to be addressed in future doctrine.

a. Emerging doctrine must establish the relationship of simultaneous attack to sequential operations within the construct of the campaign plan.

b. Joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) must provide for the synchronization of joint and combined means, i.e., coordination, relationships, and responsibilities between levels of command and supporting or supported forces. Joint doctrine must also provide targeting, airspace command and control, and fires deconfliction guidance for the joint and simultaneous use of "space" (Joint Targeting Control Board [JTCB], Joint Forces Fires Coordinator [JFFC], Fire Support Coordination Measures [FSCM], Joint Forces Air Component Commander [JFACC], etc).

c. Doctrine must be established to guide determination of the appropriate balance between force protection and offensive strikes; e.g., Theater/Tactical Missile Defense vs Joint Precision Interdiction.

d. As the ideas of precision fires and forces matures and gains acceptance, we may have to re-examine previously held views on the use of reserves.

e. Doctrine must determine if the concept is overly dependent on intelligence and long-range fires advantages. Further, the level of detail required for TTPs must be determined.

f. Doctrine must address the impact of enemies that possess similar capabilities or countermeasures that negate our technological advantage.

g. Doctrine must decide if tactical mobility and the ability to see both friendly and enemy forces, leads to precision forces as well as precision fires. What becomes of the meeting engagement?

h. It must be determined how deep the Army should fight and the variables that will determine this. How we determine objectives may need to be re-examined.

i. Doctrine is needed for operations at echelons above corps and deep operations, e.g., to cover the delineation of responsibilities for RISTA.

j. The relative merit of the elements of combat power must be addressed. The question of equality between firepower and maneuver, given that fires technology clearly allows the commander to fight "out of sight", must be answered.

k. The optimal balance between close combat capability and the ability to fight at depth must be established.

l. The impact on doctrine of nonlethal technologies in depth and simultaneous attack, such as supercaustics, polymers, and electromagnetic pulse, must be determined.

m. Doctrine must establish the level of detail, in terms of TTPs, required to insure access to and influence over theater and national assets.

n. The logistical support of this concept must be determined.

o. Doctrine must consider the impact of Information Operations and C2W.

p. The planning, coordination, and execution of deep operations will require the use of an automated deep operations coordination center (DOCC) at EAC, corps and possibly division.

4-2. Training. Depth and simultaneous attack must be ingrained in our warfighting skills. This will mandate time and assets devoted to training leaders and soldiers on the targeting methodology and TTPs required to execute this concept correctly. Training implications include:

a. Individual and unit cell training through the use of simulators. (Distributed interactive simulations such as "73 Easting, etc.)

b. Expansion of Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) to include more depth and simultaneous attack. This may require revisions to simulations, scenarios, and/or models.

c. Increased joint and combined training use of major exercises to stress events requiring extensive coordination.

d. Increase training on joint targeting, e.g. establishing targeting priorities and trigger criteria, coordinating procedures, clearance of fires, and A2C2.

e. Increased targeting training on recognizing valid targets, relaying target data to weapons systems, and coordinating clearance to fire in a timely manner.

f. TRADOC schools must integrate Battle Dynamics concepts into the curriculum.

4-3. Organization. The correct organization is required to properly execute depth and simultaneous attack. Some organizational issues which must be addressed are:

- a. The organizational agility of our forces requires improvement.
- b. The most efficient structuring of Division/Corps/EAC CPs to facilitate deep and simultaneous attack must be determined.
- c. New and improved decision making facilities such as the DOCC. Increases to existing staffs may be necessary to handle the increased coordination requirements. Or, it may be determined that automation may facilitate coordination and allow for the reduction in the size of the staff.
- d. Joint organizations to accomplish prioritization of intelligence collection requirements, prioritization of targets, and attack of lucrative targets must be developed.
- e. To support this concept, the most efficient logistics organization must be determined.
- f. The organization of a power projection army based on corps and divisions must be evaluated. The optimal organization must be determined and fielded. It may be that we should consider combined arms brigades and battalions as the basis for the power projection army.

4-4. Materiel. Without the proper equipment, depth and simultaneous attack will remain only a concept. The following issues must be addressed:

- a. The optimal balance between close combat capability and the ability to fight at depth must be determined. How do we maximize payoff of investments?
- b. There is a need for command, control, and communications systems (e.g., information management decision aids systems) that synthesize large volumes of complex information and that accommodate proactive friendly decision making. These systems are needed to enable us to stay inside the enemy's decision cycles.
- c. There is a need for responsive, reliable, and flexible, long-range secure communications systems, both service and joint, at all levels.
- d. There is a need for integrated intelligence/acquisition systems (service, joint, and national) for near-real-time intelligence and real-time sensor-to-shooter links at tactical and operational levels.
- e. There is a need for agile, combat-focused sustainment to mitigate risks inherent in simultaneous operations.
- f. There is a need for a highly deployable, long-range, joint precision fires capability.
- g. There is a need for flexible and mobile maneuver forces which tactical and operational commanders can apply with precision against critical enemy functions.

h. There is a need for smart/brilliant munitions to improve single shot destructive capability at long range, thus limiting expense and reducing logistical burdens.

i. Increased joint procurement to ensure compatibility is required.

j. There is a need for improved anti-radiation munitions.

4-5. Leader development. To execute depth and simultaneous attack leaders must have a thorough understanding of the decide, detect, deliver targeting methodology. It has applicability as a warfighting methodology and should be ingrained in our thought process.

a. Institutions, especially joint schools for senior leaders, must indoctrinate leaders with the knowledge of fighting with joint fires, fighting at depth, and the logistics considerations for these operations.

b. Commanders must view the operation/battle as a whole and develop a comprehensive plan which integrates all assets into a cohesive effort. Commanders must articulate intent for deep battle, as well as close.

4-6. Soldiers. Execution of depth and simultaneous attack will require soldiers who are well trained and ready.

Glossary

Section I

Abbreviations

A ² C ²	Army airspace command and control
ATACMS	Army Tactical Missile System
BCTP	Battle Command Training Program
BDA	battle damage assessment
C ²	command and control
C ² W	command and control warfare
C ³	command, control, and communications
C ³ I	command, control, communications and intelligence
C ⁴ I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CONUS	Continental United States
CP	command post
CSS	combat service support
DOCC	Deep Operations Coordination Center
DTLOMS	doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldiers
EAC	echelons above corps
FSCM	fire support coordination measure
JFACC	Joint Forces Air Component Commander
JFFC	Joint Forces Fires Coordinator

JTCB	Joint Targeting Control Board
METT-T	mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available
MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
OCONUS	outside continental United States
OOTW	operations other than war
RPV	remotely piloted vehicle
RISTA	reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
TDA	target damage assessment
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle

Section II Terms

Battle command

The art of battle decision making, leading, and motivating soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish missions. Includes visualizing current state and future state, then formulating concept of operations to get from one to the other at least cost. Also includes assigning missions, prioritizing and allocating resources, selecting the critical time and place to act, and knowing how and when to make adjustments during the fight.

Center of gravity

The hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends; that characteristic, capability, or location from which the enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength, or the will to fight.

Command and control warfare

The integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy an adversary's C² capabilities, while protecting friendly C² capabilities against such actions. C²W applies across the full range of military operation and all levels of war.

Culminating point

The point an offensive operation will meet where the strength of the attacker no longer significantly exceeds that of the defender, and beyond which continued offensive operations risk overextension, counterattack, and defeat.

Depth and simultaneous attack

The simultaneous application of combat power against an enemy throughout the depth of the battlefield.

Information operations

Continuous combined arms operations that enable, enhance, and protect the friendly forces' decision cycle while influencing an opponent's. These are accomplished through effective intelligence, C², and C²W operations. Supporting Battle Command, Information Operations are conducted across the full range of military operation.

Line of operation

A line that defines the directional orientation of a force in relation to the enemy and connect the force with its base or bases of operation and its operational objective.

Line of communication

All routes (air, land, and water) that connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move.

Operational art

The employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations.

Operations other than war

Military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces.

Principles of war


The principles of Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity which provide general guidance for the conduct of war at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Tenets of Army operations

The fundamental tenets (initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility) of Army operations that describe the characteristics of successful operations.

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